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ON AN ATTEMPT TO DEMONSTRATE THE
COMPATIBILITY OF DIVINE FOREKNOWLEDGE
AND HUMAN FREEDOM
Anthony Brueckner

Ted A. Warfield seeks to establish the compatibility in question by getting the
incompatibilist toreject an unpersuasive argument from fatalism to the conclusion that a given action is not freely done. He maintains that such a rejection
requires the the incompatibilist to hold that there is a possible world in which
the fatalist's premise is true and in which the conclusion is false (and so the
given action is freely done). If a foreknowing God exists in that world, then
incompatibilism must be rejected. I criticize this reasoning on the ground that
one can reject a bad argument from true premises without countenancing a
possible world in which the premises are true and yet the conclusion false.

One position on the problem of free will is that there is no possible world
in which some human acts freely. One might hold this, for example, in
virtue of thinking that both determinism and indeterminism rule out freedom. Call that view -OF. Surely a proponent of -OF can recognize the
weakness of a certain fatalistic argument against freedom. The premise
that it was true in 50 AD that Plantinga climbs Mt. Rushmore in 2000 AD
tells us nothing about whether the ascent is done freely.l Of course, the -OF
theorist will hold that the climb in question is not an example of free
human action, for reasons that have nothing to do with the fact that the
proposition that Plantinga climbs Mt. Rushmore in 2000 AD is always true.
The -OF theorist might incautiously express his rejection of the fatalistic
argument in question by holding that these two propositions are consistent:
(A)

Plantinga freely climbs Mt. Rushmore in 2000 AD.

(B)

It is true in 50 AD that Plantinga climbs Mt. Rushmore in 2000
AD.

If he expresses his rejection in that way, then Ted A. Warfield will be quick
to say that the -OF theorist holds an overall position that is self-contradictory.2 If A and B are consistent, Warfield will say, then there is a possible
world in which both propositions are true. But in that world, some human
acts freely, contrary to -OF.
But surely the -OF theorist should be free" to reject some unpersuasive
argument from acceptable premises to the conclusion that no human acts
freely without having to agree that there is a possible world in which the
premises are true and the conclusion false! His view is that there is no possiII
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ble world in which the conclusion is false (i.e., in which A is true).
Bearing these points in mind, suppose that we encounter a philosopher,
Divinco, who shares the -OF theorist's disdain for the fatalistic argument.
Divinco believes that divine foreknowledge is incompatible with human
freedom, and he believes that God is omniscient and foreknowing in every
possible world. So Divinco shares the -OF theorist's opinion that there is no
possible world in which humans act freely.
Warfield seeks to parlay Divinco's rejection of the fatalistic argument into
a commihnent to the compatibility of freedom and foreknowledge. 3 His strategy is to claim that in order to reject the reasoning from the eternal truth of
propositions to human unfreedom, one must hold that there is a possible
world in which A and B are both true. But that will be a world in which,
according to a philosopher like Divinco, God exists and foreknows every
human action, including Plantinga's 2000 AD ascent. And it will be a world
in which A is true-in which Plantinga freely climbs.' Thus, Warfield says,
divine foreknowledge and human freedom are compatible. That is, they
areshown to be compatible, Warfield says, relative to Divinco's assumption
that a foreknowing, omniscient God exists in all possible worlds. Warfield
points out (section VI) that this sort of argument cannot be used against an
incompatibilist who holds that some possible worlds lack an omniscient
God. He also maintains that the argument cannot be used to show that
determinism is compatible with human freedom. This limitation depends
upon there being possible worlds in which some events are not causally
determined. Thus, a (putative) world in which A and B are both true need
not be a world in which Plantinga's climb is causally determined. It is worth
noting, however, that if determinism holds in all possible worlds (as might
be maintained by someone who holds a version of the Principle of Sufficient
Reason), then Warfield's reasoning, if cogent, could be used to show the
compatibility of determinism and freedom.
Warfield's attempt to show that divine foreknowledge and human freedom are compatible is unsuccessful. The moral of the foregoing story of the
-OF theorist is that rejecting the fatalistic argument does not force one to
hold that there is a possible world in which the argument's premise is true
and its conclusion false (i.e., a world in which A and B are both true). On
Divinco's view, there is no possible world in which its conclusion is false
(i.e., in which A is true).
Philosophers often argue about the truth value of propositions which, if
true, are necessarily true. A philosopher may find himself in the position of
thinking that P is true and necessary, while wondering whether a certain
argument from acceptable premises provides good reasons for believing
that P. If such a philosopher finds the considered argument wanting, then
this need not depend upon his thinking that there is a possible world in
which the premises are true and yet the conclusion-P-is false. Even
though he finds the argument in question wanting, he still believes (maybe
for other good reasons) that P is true and necessary. Similarly, I might well
reject a purported proof (from acceptable assumptions) of a mathematical
proposition M which I believe, even though I do not for a moment hold
that there is some possible world in which the "proof's" assumptions are
true and yet M is false.
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So now we can see that it was not, after all, crucial to Warfield's reasoning that he consider the fatalistic argument from the eternal truth of propositions. He could equally well have considered any other bad argument
from acceptable premises to the conclusion that Plantinga does not freely
climb. By Warfield's reasoning, if Divinco rejects the bad argument, then
this commits him to there being a possible world in which A and the bad
argument's premises are true. But then Divinco must accede to the compatibility claim, since, on his view, God foreknows Plantinga's climb in the
world in question.
I conclude that compatibilism about freedom and foreknowledge cannot
be as easily conjured as Warfield would have us believe. 5
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NOTES
1. See, e.g., Peter van Inwagen's An Essay on Free Will (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1983), chapter two, for a critical discussion of the fatalistic
argument.
2. See his "Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom Are
Compatible", Nous 31:1 (1997), pp. 80-6.
3. See "Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom Are Compatible".
4. I have simplified Warfield's reasoning a bit. See his section IV.
5. I would like to thank C. Anthony Anderson for a helpful discussion of
these issues.

